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CONTAINER CORPORATION OF AMERICA v.
FRANCHISE TAX BOARD:
STATE TAXATION OF FOREIGN INCOME AND
THE WORLDWIDE COMBINED UNITARY
METHOD: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT PASSES THE BUCK TO CONGRESS
The power to levy a corporate income tax is a state right
which was first exercised in 1911 and has now been implemented by forty-four states.' The most popular 2 corporate in* 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983).
1. See United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321 (1918)
(Wisconsin income tax upheld as constitutional and not in violation of the
commerce clause although taxable income included income from interstate
sales). Wisconsin enacted its corporate income tax to help support the
rapid increase in the state's public expenditures. Today, forty-four states
and the District of Columbia have some type of corporate income tax.
COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT To THE CHAnIMAN, HOUSE COMMrrrEE ON

WAYS AND MEANS, Key Issues Affecting State Taxation Of Multijurisdictional CorporateIncome Needs Resolving (July 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited
as COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT].

The states have the power to levy taxes in accordance with their own
laws, subject to constitutional restrictions imposed principally by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment and the commerce clause. See
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979) (risk of double
taxation of foreign instrumentalities of commerce violated foreign commerce clause); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Missouri State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S.
317 (1968) (state property tax violated due process clause and commerce
clause because mileage formula yielded grossly distorted result in assessment of taxpayer's rolling stock); Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue,
303 U.S. 250 (1938) (privilege tax does not violate the commerce clause even
if based on gross receipts from sale of advertising by interstate contract for
publication circulated in both intrastate and interstate); Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920) (use of formulary apportionment does not violate due process clause in absence of showing that
procedure produces unreasonable result). The equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment and the imports-exports clause also impose constitutional restrictions on state taxing powers. See Michelin Tire Corp. v.
Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976) (nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax
against imported goods that were no longer in import transit did not violate
import-export clause). These restrictions, however, have not had the same
impact on state taxation of multijurisdictional corporations as the due process and commerce clauses.
To meet the requirements of the due process clause, a minimal connection must exist between the corporation's activity and the taxing state, and
the income attributed to the state for taxing purposes must be rationally
related to income-generating values within the taxing state. See Exxon
Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980); Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U.S. 425 (1980). Under the commerce clause, a state is prohibited from adopting a taxing scheme which
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come tax theory 3 is the worldwide combined unitary business
principle, 4 which contemplates a very broad state power;5 it is
discriminates against, or places an undue burden on, interstate commerce.
See generally supra COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT.

2. Today, twenty-four states employ the unitary method of tax assessment. Twelve of the twenty-four states have adopted the worldwide approach to unitary taxation. The states employing the worldwide approach,
in addition to California, are Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, and Utah.
See Daily Tax Rep. Pub. No. 186, Unitary Tax G-3 (Sept. 23, 1983). It is
interesting to note that, in 1979, only California and Oregon had employed
the worldwide unitary method of taxation. See Daily Tax Rep. Pub. No. 188,
Unitary Tax G4 (Sept. 27, 1983).
The most recent state to adopt the worldwide combined unitary method
is Florida; the Florida state legislators enacted the worldwide approach on
July 12, 1983, just fifteen days after the Supreme Court handed down the
Container decision. See Daily Tax Rep. Pub. No. 136, Court's Blueprint
Used By FloridaIn Unitary Tax Law G-5 (July 14, 1983).
Indiana is often improperly classified as a worldwide combined unitary
state. Indiana's tax is a consolidated gross receipts tax. Related corporations, doing business in Indiana, are consolidated to eliminate intercompany transactions which are not subject to the gross receipts tax. Indiana
law does permit worldwide combined unitary income apportionment. It
does not, however, require taxpayers to file their tax returns on the worldwide combined basis. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2-1-37 - 6-2-1-53 (Burns 1978);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 6-3-1-1 - 6-3-2-4 (Burns 1978).
3. There are three basic theories used to determine income attributable to a state: separate accounting, specific allocation, and formulary apportionment. See also infra note 6.
4. The basic justification for combined unitary apportionment is stated
as follows:
Once formulary apportionment is accepted as the standard method of
dividing the taxable income of a single corporation that conducts a unitary business in more than one State, there is no justification, in principle at least, for failing to apply formulary apportionment to the income
of a group of controlled corporations that comprise a unitary business.
The only difference between the two cases lies in the form of business
organization, i.e., the organization of a business enterprise through subsidiaries, as distinguished from branches, a factor that should not affect
State tax apportionment.
J. HELLERSTEIN,

STATE TAXATION I CORPORATE INCOME AND FRANCHISE

TAXEs § 8.12 (1983).
5. It is well settled that a state can include, in a corporation's apportionable income, all domestic income from unitary operations so long as the
apportionment factor fairly and reasonably attributes the income to the
state. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942) (holding three-factor
formulary apportionment method applied to income of taxpayer's wholesales distributing houses in several states constitutional under fourteenth
amendment where there is a certain degree of unity of ownership and management). The unitary concept was also more recently articulated in Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U.S. 425 (1980) and Exxon
Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980). These decisions
held that the "linchpin of apportionability" which establishes the taxpayer's tax liability in appropriate proportion to the taxpayer's business
transactions in the state is the "unitary business" principle that the taxpayer's intra-state and extra-state activities form part of a single unitary
business. Cf. ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982);
F.W. Woolworth v. Taxation and Revenue Dept., 458 U.S. 354 (1982). These
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also the more controversial theory. 6 In ContainerCorporationof
cases held that the due process limitation of the fourteenth amendment is
not satisfied merely if income in question adds to riches of corporation; the
proper inquiry looks to the underlying unity or diversity of the business
enterprise, not to whether some economic benefit is derived simply from
ownership of stock in another corporation. See generally Corrigan, The Multistate Tax Commission's Reaction to Asarco and Woolworth: Petitionfor
Rehearing, 1 J. ST. TAX'N 210 (1982) (excerpt from amicus curiae brief);
Hanson, Asarco and Woolworth-Refining Mobil and the "Unitary Business" Test for Apportioning Intangible Income, 1 J. ST. TAX'N 197 (1982);
Seago, The Revitalization of the Unitary Business Principle-Asarco and
Woolworth, 1 J. ST. TAx'N 101 (1982).
6. The constitutionality of the worldwide combined unitary method
was questionable. The overall tax liabilities of multinational corporations
increased simply because a state would adopt a new method to apportion
income to the state. The unitary method of combined reporting also affects
large U.S. multijurisdictional companies as well as multinational companies. See Dexter, The Unitary Concept in State Taxation of Multistate-Multinational Businesses, 10 URB. LAw. 181 (1978).
Today, many corporations do business in more than one state. These
multijurisdictional companies also pay most of the state's corporate income
taxes. For example, taxes collected from multijurisdictional corporations in
1977 accounted for approximately 56% of the $9 billion states collected from
all corporate taxpayers, even though multijurisdictional corporations filed
only 18% of the total corporate tax returns. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 1.
Because many corporations do business in more than one state, only
that income which is reasonably attributable to the state can be apportioned to the state. ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n., 458 U.S. 307
(1982); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dept., 458 U.S. 354
(1982); Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980); Underwood
Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920) (apportionment of separate company income based on the proportion of its net income which its
assets within the state bear to its total assets not in violation of the due
process or the commerce clause).
States use different methods to apportion taxable income attributable
to their jurisdiction. This results in inconsistencies which have led numerous taxpayers to litigate alleged violations of the due process clause and the
commerce clause. See infra note 114. Generally, three methods are used to
determine the tax base of multistate corporations among the states in
which the corporation does business: separate accounting, specific allocation, and formulary apportionment. See Henszey & Koot, Is A Three Factor
Apportionment Formula Fair?,35 THE TAX EXEC. 141 (1983). Separate accounting applies to situations in which a corporation's source of income and
expenses is clearly identifiable. Id. at 142. Specific allocation is used for
passive or nonbusiness income, such as interest income and capital gains.
Id.
Most states use the formulary apportionment method which is based
on the theory that income attributable to a corporation within a certain jurisdiction is a function of a combination of factors; if uniformly applied, it
should result in fair apportionment among all the jurisdictions in which the
corporation does business. Id.
The most common factors used in this method are property, payroll,
and sales. The application of these factors by the states may vary from
equal weight being given to all three, to the use of only one factor, usually
sales. See generally L. HALE & R. KRAMER, STATE TAX LIABnrrY AND COMPLIANCE MANUAL (1981).
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America v. Franchise Tax Board,7 the United States Supreme
Court, for the first time, considered whether the worldwide combined method of unitary state income taxation 8 was constitutional.9 The question of constitutionality arose 10 because this
method may result in double taxation of foreign income'
thereby impairing uniformity in foreign relations.' 2 The Court
held that California's worldwide combined unitary tax was constitutional and, in so doing, broadened the taxing power of the
states.' 3

Container Corporation of America is a Delaware corporation which has its headquarters in Illinois and does business in
California as well as other states. 14 Container Corporation also
has foreign subsidiaries that have incorporated in the countries
where they operate.' 5 In its returns for the years 1963, 1964, and
1965,16 Container Corporation omitted all of the income, payroll,
property, and sales of its foreign subsidiaries when calculating
the share of its net income that was apportionable to California
7. 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983).
8. See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE ANN. §§ 25123-25136 (West 1979)
(permitting worldwide combined unitary taxation).
9. Id.
10. The constitutional questions arose under the due process clause,
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; the commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3; and the foreign commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Court
addressed two preliminary issues before it reached the foreign commerce
clause question. First, the Court determined Container Corporation was a
unitary business. See infra note 27. Second, the Court concluded that California's apportionment method was fair. See infra note 29.
11. See infra note 12.
12. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979) (California property tax on cargo containers found unconstitutional). In that
case, the Court found there was double taxation by California and Japan; in
addition, the tax prevented the federal government from "speaking with
one voice" because the United States had already signed a Customs Convention on Containers with Japan. Id. at 453-54.
13. 103 S.Ct. 2933 (1983).
14. Container Corporation is in the business of manufacturing customordered paperboard packaging. It produces paperboard from raw timber
and wastepaper. The operation of the business is largely domestic. Id. at
2943.
15. During the years at issue, Container Corporation owned twenty foreign subsidiaries incorporated and located in four Latin American and four
European countries. Container Corporation's percentage ownership of the
subsidiaries, directly or indirectly, ranged between 66.7% and 100%. In
those companies in which Container Corporation did not own a 100% interest, the remaining interest was owned by local nationals. The foreign subsidiaries were in essentially the same business as Container Corporation.
Id. at 2943.
16. 103 S. Ct. at 2945 (1983).
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under a three-factor formula.' 7
After reviewing Container Corporation's tax returns, the
California Franchise Tax Board issued deficiency notices.' 8 The
Franchise Tax Board contended that Container Corporation
should have treated its overseas subsidiaries as part of its unitary business, rather than as a passive investment.' 9 Container
Corporation paid the additional20 assessment under protest and
brought an action for a refund.
The California Superior Court upheld the Tax Board's additional assessments. 2 ' The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower
court's decision. 22 The California Superior Court, on appeal, refused discretionary review. 23 The United States Supreme Court
noted jurisdiction on May 3, 1982.24
The United States Supreme Court held 25 that California's
tax did not violate the due process clause 26 because Container
Corporation and its foreign subsidiaries constituted a "unitary
business. ' 27 The Court further held that California's tax did not
17. CAL.REV. & TAX. CODE ANN. §§ 25105-25136 (West 1979). The threefactor apportionment formula uses payroll, property, and sales factors to

apportion income to the state. The formula is:
payroll in state
payroll everywhere

I/ property in state
property everywhere ]

/

sales in state
sales everywhere]

3
x Combined Worldwide Income

=

Apportioned Income

For additional discussion on the three-factor formula, see Henszey & Koot,
Is A Three FactorApportionment Formula Fair?, 35 THE TA EXEC. 141
(1983).
18. 103 S.Ct. at 2945 (1983).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 117 Cal. App. 3d 988,
173 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1981).
23. The memorandum opinion and judgment of the California Supreme
Court are not reported.
24. 456 U.S. 960 (1982).
25. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933 (1983).

Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Rehnquist joined. Justice Powell filed a dissenting
opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor joined. Justice
Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
27. The Court began its analysis by identifying the elements which constitute a unitary business. 103 S.Ct. at 2940-42. The Court then concluded
that Container Corporation and its subsidiaries were a unitary business.
Id. at 2948. The Court refused to review in any detail the particular facts of
the taxpayer's business. The Court stated:
The state Court of Appeal relied on a large number of factors in reaching its judgment that appellant and its foreign subsidiaries constituted
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violate the commerce clause 28 because application of the three29
factor apportionment formula resulted in fair apportionment.
Further, the Court stated that double taxation of foreign income
did not necessarily violate the foreign commerce clause, 30 and
that the impairment of federal uniformity must also be considered when determining whether a state tax on foreign income
violates the foreign commerce clause. 3 1 Also, California's tax did
not impair federal uniformity because the tax did not implicate
any foreign policy issues which must be left to the federal government, and because the tax did not violate any clear federal
directive. 32 Accordingly, the Court affirmed the California Court
33
of Appeal's decision.
a unitary business ....

We need not decide whether any one of these

factors would be sufficient as a constitutional matter to prove the existence of a unitary business. Taken in combination, at least, they clearly
demonstrate that the state court reached a conclusion 'within the realm
of permissible judgment.'
Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2933, 2947-48 (1983).
See also supra note 5 for discussions of recent Supreme Court cases
articulating the principles constituting a unitary business.
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
29. 103 S. Ct. at 2942-43. The Court determined that California's apportionment methodology was fair because it produced a result which was
"certainly within the substantial margin of error inherent in any method of
attributing income among the components of a unitary business." Id. at

2950. The Court also held that Container Corporation did not satisfy its burden of proof because it failed to show that "there is no rational relationship
between the income attributed to the state and the intrastate values of the
enterprise." Id. at 2948 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes
of Vermont, 445 U.S. 425, 436 (1980)).
In Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123
(1931), the Court struck down a North Carolina income tax because the taxpayer was able to establish that the state's method of apportioning income
resulted in a tax more than 250% greater than the tax computed by the taxpayer. Container Corporation showed that California's method of apportionment resulted in a tax 14% greater than the tax computed by Container
Corporation using formulary apportionment on a separate company basis.
Id. at 2950. The Court upheld California's tax in Container.
It is now apparent, therefore, that fair apportionment will be found to
exist when the difference between the tax calculated by the taxpayer and
that by the state is less than or equal to 14%. If the difference exceeds
250%, then the apportionment method must be stricken. Obviously, under
this guideline, much uncertainty will still exist. For example, it is not certain whether a difference of 23% could be considered to be fair or unfair
using the Hans Rees and Container decisions as guidelines.
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
31. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. at 2953. The
Court held that double taxation alone does not require a finding of a violation of the foreign commerce clause. See also infra note 40 and accompanying text.
32. Id. at 2933, 2955-57. See also infra note 41 and accompanying text.
33. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2933, 2957
(1983). Justice Powell, in his dissent, found that, with respect to the foreign
commerce clause issue, the majority failed 'to apply "close scrutiny" in a
manner that met the requirements of that exacting standard of review. Id.
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The United States Supreme Court began its analysis by determining that any state tax which is levied on the foreign income of a domestic unitary corporation must satisfy four
constitutional tests.3" The state tax must meet the due process
clause test and the commerce clause test, which are also applied
to the out-of-state income of these corporations. 35 In addition,
the tax must satisfy two tests which are imposed by the foreign
commerce clause. To meet the due process clause test, a minimal connection between the interstate activities and the taxing
state must exist. 36 To meet the commerce clause test, there
must be a rational relationship between the income attributed
to the state and the intrastate values of the enterprise. 37 The
foreign commerce clause tests were best articulated in Japan
Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles. 38 Under the first test, according to Japan Line, the tax cannot result in double taxation
of foreign instrumentalities of commerce. 39 "[E]ven a slight
overlapping of tax-a problem that might be deemed de minimis
in a domestic context-assumes importance when sensitive
matters of foreign relations and national sovereignty are concerned." 40 The second test of Japan Line states that the state
In his opinion, the California tax should be struck down because it violated

the foreign commerce clause and prevented the federal government from
"speaking with one voice." Id. at 2959, 2961.
34. Id. at 2940, 2950. See infra notes 36-40 and accompanying text for
additional discussion of the development of the four tests.
35. For the purposes of this casenote, foreign income refers to income
derived from a corporation's international operations. Domestic income
earned by a corporation in a state other than the state assessing the income
tax is "out-of-state income."
36. 103 S. Ct. at 2940. See Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue,
447 U.S. 207, 219-20 (1980) (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of
Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 436-37 (1980)). See also Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437
U.S. 267, 272-73 (1978) (holding that Due Process Clause requires that no tax
may be imposed unless there is some minimal connection between business activities and the taxing state and that the income attributed to the
state must be rationally related to values connected with the taxing state);
see also National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 at
756 (1967) (there must be some minimal connection); Norfolk & Western R.
Co. v. Missouri Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317 (1968) (there must be a rational
relationship to property values connected with taxing state).
37. See supra note 36.
38. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 447-48 (1979).
39. Id. at 447.
40. 441 U.S. at 447-48. The Court explained:
IN] either this Court nor this Nation can ensure full apportionment
when one of the taxing entities is a foreign sovereign. If an instrumentality of commerce is domiciled abroad, the country of domicile may
have the right, consistent with the custom of nations, to impose a tax on
its full value. If a State should seek to tax the same instrumentality on
an apportioned basis, multiple taxation inevitably results .... Due to
the absence of an authoritative tribunal capable of ensuring that the
aggregation of taxes is computed on no more than one full value, a state
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tax cannot "impair federal uniformity in an area where federal
uniformity is essential" or prevent the federal government from
"speaking with one voice. '4 1
In Container,the Court first decided that the tests imposed
tax, even though 'fairly apportioned' to reflect an instrumentality's
presence within the State, may subject foreign commerce 'to the risk of
a double tax burden to which domestic commerce is not exposed, and
which the commerce clause forbids.'
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 447 (1979).
See also Evco v. Jones, 409 U.S. 91 (1972). A gross receipts tax on total

proceeds received by corporations from certain contracts entered into
outside the state would subject interstate commerce to risk of a double tax
burden to which intrastate commerce should not be exposed and which the
commerce clause forbids); J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938)
(subjecting interstate commerce to risk of double tax burden to which intrastate commerce is not exposed forbidden by commerce clause); Western
Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938) (multiplication of state

taxes would destroy interstate commerce and renew barriers to interstate
trade which commerce clause sought to remove).
41. 441 U.S. 434 (1979). The Court has long recognized that there are
powers granted by the Constitution which, by their nature, are vested exclusively in Congress. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.)
299 (1851) (certain congressional powers "are in their nature national, or
admit of one uniform system"). The need for national uniformity in dealing
with foreign nations was recognized very early by the Court. Railroad Co. v.
Maryland, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 456 (1874) (regulation of vehicles of commerce
"being instrumentalities of intercommunication with other countries" is assumed by Congress). A clearer statement by the Court expressing the need
for national uniformity in international commerce was later expressed in
Bowman v. Chicago & Nw Ry., 125 U.S. 465 (1888). In that case, the Court
stated: "The organization of our state and federal system of Government is
such that the people of the several States can have no relations with foreign
powers in respect to commerce or any other subject, except through the
government of the United States and its laws and treaties." Id. at 482. See
also Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933).
In that case, the Court stated: "In international relations and with respect
to foreign intercourse and trade the people of the United States act through
a single government with unified and adequate national power." Id. at 59.
Accord Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976). Concerning the
import-export clause, the Michelin Court found that the Framers' overriding concern was that "the Federal Government must speak with one voice
when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments. . ." Id. at
285. After noting the Michelin Court's finding, the Japan Line Court found
that "(t] he need for federal uniformity is no less paramount in ascertaining
the negative implications of Congress' power to (regulate commerce with
foreign Nations) under the Commerce Clause." (footnote omitted). 441
U.S., at 449. See generally Comment, The Negative Commerce Clause-A
Strict Test For State Taxation Of Foreign Commerce, 13 INT'L L. & POL.135
(1980); Note, The Foreign Commerce Clause: An Economic Approach to the
Negative Effects of State Taxation, 13 J. MAR. L. REv. 793 (1980); Note, State
Taxation of Foreign-Owned InstrumentalitiesUsed Exclusively in Foreign
Commerce is Forbidden by the Commerce Clause When Multiple Taxation
or Impairment of Uniform Federal Regulation of Foreign Commerce Would
Result, 19 VA. J. INT'L L. 915 (1979); Note, State Tax on Instrumentalitiesof
Foreign Commerce Invalid When Tax Results in Multiple Taxation and Impairs Federal Uniformity in Regulation of Foreign Trade, 12 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 999 (1979).
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42
by the due process and the commerce clauses were satisfied.
The Court then addressed the two tests imposed by the foreign
commerce clause. 43 The Court noted the relevance of Japan
Line in addressing the foreign commerce clause issue," but
concluded that it was not controlling in Container because the
distinctions in the cases amounted to "a constitutionally signifi'45
cant difference.
According to Container,the California taxing scheme satisfied the double taxation test of the foreign commerce clause because Japan Line did not absolutely require the striking down
of a tax that results in only a slight double taxation of foreign
income. 46 The Container Court noted that the Japan Line Court
relied on "much more than the fact of double taxation to strike
down the state tax."47 In order to avoid the double taxation in

42. 103 S. Ct. at 2945-50 (1983).
43. 103 S. Ct. at 2950.
44. Id. In Japan Line, California attempted to impose an apparently
fairly apportioned property tax on cargo containers owned by a Japanese
corporation and used in foreign commerce. The cargo containers were also
subject to a non-apportioned Japanese property tax. A convention signed
by the United States and Japan made it clear that neither national government would impose a tax on cargo containers temporarily imported where
the home port was in the other nation. The Court held in Japan Line that
the California property tax was unconstitutional because it failed to meet
the two tests mandated by the foreign commerce clause. See Japan Line,
Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
45. 103 S. Ct. at 2953. In comparing Japan Line to Container,the Court
noted three ways in which Containerwas distinguishable from Japan Line:
First, the Court concluded Japan Line involved a property tax while
Container involved an income tax. Citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner
of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 444-46 (1980), and Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of
Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 228-29 (1980), the Container Court suggested that
"the reasons for allocation to a single situs that often apply in the case of
property taxation carry little force" in the case of income taxation. Mobil,
445 U.S. at 445.
Second, the Court concluded that double taxation was not the "inevitable" result of the California taxing scheme. To support this statement, the

Court referred to Chicago Bridge &Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 103 S.
Ct. 3562 (1983). The Illinois application of the worldwide combined apportionment resulted in a refund to Caterpillar from the amount paid in those
instances in which Caterpillar previously filed its tax returns on a separate
company basis but did not include foreign income. ContainerCorp., 103 S.
Ct. at 2952 n.25. For an additional discussion on this finding by the Court,
see infra note 82. After the Container decision, Chicago Bridge & Iron was
dismissed for lack of a substantial federal question.

Third, the Court concluded that, in Japan Line, the tax fell upon the
foreign owners of the instrumentality in foreign commerce; in Container,on

the other hand, the tax fell on a corporation domiciled and headquartered
in the United States. The Court pointed out that they had specifically left
open the application of Japan Line to "domestically owned instrumentalities engaged in foreign commerce." Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 444 n.7.

46. 103 S. Ct. at 2953.
47. For a further discussion of this statement by the Court, see infra
note 74.
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Japan Line, the Court found it reasonable, under the facts of
that case, to simply order California not to tax the containers at
all.4 8 The Container Court, however, believed that a "brightline" rule abolishing the tax completely in order to avoid constitutional violations would be unfair in this case because a portion
4
of the corporation's income was clearly domestic.

9

The Court rejected the plaintiff's suggestion that California
should be required to follow the federal approach to taxation of
foreign income.5 0 The Court reasoned that requiring California
to follow the federal "arm's-length" approach to taxation "would
not by any means guarantee an end to double taxation."'1 The
Court further reasoned that, because California's method of ap48. The Container Court concluded that this bright-line rule had not
been unfair in JapanLine because "the rule did no more than reflect consistent international practice and express federal policy." 103 S. Ct. at 2953.
49. Id.
50. Appellant's Brief On The Merits at 29-36, Container Corp. of Am. v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983). Container Corporation argued
that because the "arm's-length" approach was the internationally accepted
norm for allocating income to taxing jurisdictions and because no California
tax credit or deduction was available for foreign taxes paid on foreign income, "double taxation of such income is inescapable. Such improper apportionment of income and resulting double taxation unavoidably frustrate
the United States foreign policy of promoting the free international flow of
capital and technology and therefore violates the commerce clause." Id. at
36.
The federal government uses the arm's-length approach to taxation of
interrelated corporations. The arm's-length approach treats each corporation as a separate entity for income tax purposes. Closely related corporations, however, engage in transfers of values that are not fully reflected in
formal company ledgers. 103 S.Ct. at 2953. See generally Human, The Tempest Over The Treaty: Implications of the United States-United Kingdom
Tax Treatyfor State and Local Taxation, 23 ST. LOuis U.L.J. 509 (1979) (discussion of 26 U.S.C. § 482 and federal system of separate accounting). Thus,
due to the fact that transfers between related corporations may not be reflected in their formal ledgers, 26 U.S.C. § 482 (1982) provides that "the Secretary (of the Treasury) may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income,
deductions,. .. between or among such ... businesses, if he determines
that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to
prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any such ...
businesses." I.R.C. § 482 (1983).
Unlike the federal approach to taxation, the worldwide combined
method of unitary taxation first combines the income from all related corporations that are engaged in the same unitary business and the three-factor
apportionment method is then used to apportion the income to the state of
California. See supra note 17.
51. 103 S. Ct. at 2953. The Court concluded that double taxation can still
result even under the federal arm's-length approach despite provisions,
such as I.R.C. § 482, which allow the federal taxing authority to reallocate
income and expenses to reflect the income of an entity properly. The Court
also concluded: "A serious problem ... is that ... the precise rules under
which they reallocate income among affiliated corporations often differ substantially, and whenever that difference exists, the possibility of double taxation also exists." 103 S.Ct. at 2953-54.
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portionment did not inevitably lead to double taxation, 52 it
would be "perverse" to require California to follow the federal
approach which may itself lead to double taxation at times.5 3 Finally, the Court observed that: "In the absence of a central coordinating authority, absolute consistency, even among taxing
authorities whose basic approach to the task is quite similar,
may be too much to ask."54
The Court then examined the second, two-prong test, imposed by the foreign commerce clause. 55 The Court reasoned
that the foreign commerce clause imposes the two-pronged test
5 6
because federal uniformity is essential in international trade.
The foreign commerce clause is designed to protect federal uniformity. 57 A state tax may impair federal uniformity and prevent the federal government from "speaking with one voice" in
regulating foreign commerce if it either implicates foreign policy
issues which must be left to the federal government or violates a
clear federal directive.5 8 The Court concluded that California's
52. See infra note 81.
53. 103 S. Ct. at 2954-55.
54. Id. at 2954. The Court footnoted this statement; it recognized that
double taxation is sometimes mitigated by provisions in tax treaties which
provide for inter-governmental negotiations to resolve differences in the approaches of the respective taxing authorities. The Court further noted that
California was in no position to negotiate with foreign governments and
that neither the tax treaties nor federal law provided a mechanism by which
the federal government could negotiate on behalf of the states. The Court
finally noted that, in any event, these negotiations did not always occur or
were not always successful. Id. at 2954 n.31.
55. See infra note 58.
56. 103 S. Ct. at 2951.
57. See Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 286 (1976). In Michelin Tire, the Court found that the Framers' intent in drafting the importexport clause was to insure against no concurrent state power to tax the
imports because "the Federal Government must speak with one voice when
regulating commercial relations with foreign governments, and tariffs,
which might affect foreign relations, could not be implemented by the
States consistently with that exclusive power." Id. at 285.
58. 103 S. Ct. at 2955. This marked the first time the Court had introduced this succinct two-pronged test to determine whether federal uniformity was impaired. The genesis of the two tests, however, came from Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980). The federal directive test stems from the Court's statement: "Concurrent federal and state
taxation of income, of course, is a well established norm. Absent some explicit directive from Congress, we cannot infer that treatment of foreign income at the federal level mandates identical treatment by the States." Id.
at 448. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979) developed the federal uniformity test. In distinguishing the Japan Line case
from Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948) (sustaining a
Michigan statute's application against foreign commerce clause challenge),
the Court stated:
Whereas in Bob-Lo the risk that foreign commerce would be burdened
by inconsistent international regulation was 'remote,' the risk that foreign commerce will be burdened by international multiple taxation
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tax did not violate either prong of the second foreign commerce
clause test.59
The Container Court stated that the most obvious foreign
policy implication of a worldwide combined state income tax
would be the threat of offending the foreign trading partners of
the United States and, consequently, inciting them to retaliate
against the nation as a whole. 60 The Court admitted that it was
not competent to determine precisely when foreign nations
would be offended. 61 In the absence of explicit directives from
Congress, 62 the Court decided that it could only develop objective standards which reflect very general observations about63 the
effect a tax may have on international trade and relations.
Based on that analysis, the Court concluded that the California tax would not lead to significant foreign retaliation because the tax did not create an automatic asymmetry in
international taxation.M Also, the tax in Containerwas imposed
upon a domestic company, rather than a foreign corporation as
in Japan Line. 65 The Court further reasoned that Container
Corporation was amenable to being taxed in California because
here has been realized in fact. And whereas the Michigan statute posed
no threat at all to the Federal Government's ability to 'speak with one
voice' in regulating foreign trade, the impairment of federal uniformity
worked by California's statute is substantial.
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 456 n.20 (1979).
59. 103 S. Ct. at 2953-57.
60. 103 S. Ct. at 2955 (citing Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,
441 U.S. 434 (1979)). "[Ilf a novel state tax creates an asymmetry in the
international tax structure, foreign nations disadvantaged by the levy may
retaliate. . . .Such retaliation of necessity would be directed at American
transportation equipment in general, not just the taxing State, so that the
Nation as a whole would suffer." Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,
441 U.S. 434, 450 (1979).
61. 103 S.Ct. at 2955.
62. Id. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
63. 103 S.Ct. at 2955.
64. Id. But see 103 S.Ct. at 2959 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell
said: ' This seems to mean only that the California tax does not result in
double taxation in every case. But the fundamental inconsistency between
the two methods of apportionment (unitary and federal arm's-length)
means that double taxation is inevitable."
65. In Container, the Court footnoted this observation and stated:
We recognize that the fact that the legal incidence of a tax falls on a
corporation whose formal corporate domicile is domestic might be less
bignificant in the case of a domestic corporation that was owned by foreign interests. We need not decide here whether such a case would
require us to alter our analysis.
Container,103S. Ct. at 2956 n.32.
For a further discussion on the significance of this statement by the
court, see infra note 107 and accompanying text. But see Justice Powell's
dissenting opinion in Container, 103 S.Ct. at 2957. Referring to the Court's
observation that foreign nations will not retaliate because the legal incidence of the tax is on a domestic corporation, Justice Powell stated:
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the amount of tax it paid was more a function of the tax rate
than of its allocation method. 66 Finally, the Court decided that
United States foreign policy was not seriously threatened. The
Court supported its conclusion by stating that the executive
branch did not file an amicus curiae brief in the Container case
case with issues similar to those
as it had done in another
67
presented in Container.

In addressing the second prong of the foreign commerce
clause test, the Court decided that federal uniformity was not
68
impaired because the tax did not violate any federal directives.
The Court found no clear federal directive prohibiting California's worldwide combined method of unitary taxation because
there was no claim that "the federal tax statutes provide the
necessary pre-emptive force. ' 69 Also, according to the Court,
California's tax was not a matter of international concern, but
was one of only local concern.7 0 The Court additionally relied on
I have several problems with this argument .... Even if foreign governments are indifferent about the overall tax burden of an American

corporation, they have legitimate grounds to complain when a heavier

tax is calculated on the basis of the income of corporations domiciled in
their countries. If nothing else, such a tax has the effect of discouraging
American investment in their countries.
Id. at 2959.
66. Container, 103 S. Ct. at 2956. But see Justice Powell's dissenting
opinion. "[TIhe argument ignores the political restraints that make such a
course (of raising the tax rate) infeasible." Id. at 2960. His dissent pointed
out that California would have to raise the tax rate for all corporations and
this should be done "through the political process in which corporations
doing business in California are free to voice their objections." Id.
67. The Court noted that the Solicitor General had filed a brief opposing
the worldwide formula apportionment by a state in Chicago Bridge & Iron
Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 103 S. Ct. 3562 (1983) (case dismissed).
Container,103 S. Ct. at 2956 n.33. The Court concluded, however, that, because the Solicitor General had not fied a similar brief in the Container
case, there was no indication that the government's position in Chicago
Bridge & Iron still represented its views or that the brief in the Chicago
Bridge & Iron case should apply to the Container case. Id.
But see the dissenting opinion in Container, noting that the Solicitor
General's brief in Chicago Bridge & Iron was directly on point and that Chicago Bridge & Iron was currently pending before the Court. Id. at 2960.
Justice Powell concluded: "As long as Chicago Bridge & Iron remains
before us, we must conclude that the Government's views are accurately
reflected in the Solicitor General's memorandum in that pending case." Id.
68. Container, 103 S.Ct. at 2956.
69. Id.
70. Id.The Court concluded that a state's taxation of foreign income is
really a matter of local concern. Id.
Although the United States is a party to a great number of tax treaties
that require the Federal Government to adopt some form of arm'slength analysis in taxing the domestic income of multinational enterprises, that requirement is generally waived with respect to the taxes
imposed by each of the contracting nations on its own domestic
corporations.
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the Senate's rejection of a treaty that would have prevented the
states from using the worldwide combined unitary approach of
taxing corporations.7 1 Finally, the Court noted that Congress
has long debated, but has not yet enacted, legislation designed
72
to regulate state taxation of income.
The Container decision would undoubtedly have been better reasoned and more consistent with precedent if it had struck
down the California tax. Following the guidelines of Japan
Line, California's tax should have been ruled unconstitutional
for a number of reasons. Double taxation in fact occurred. A
"bright-line" rule banning double taxation of foreign income
could have been easily applied in Container. Also, the worldwide combined approach inevitably results in double taxation.
In addition, because double taxation is inevitable, the federal
arm's-length approach to taxing foreign income is preferable; it
is more consistent with the international custom of taxation
which is designed, in part, to eliminate double taxation. The
federal approach is also preferable because competent authority
Id. See United States Draft Model Income Tax Treaty of June 16, 1981 Arts.
1(3) & 7(2), reprinted in P-H Tax Treaties Par. 1022 [hereinafter cited as
Model Treaty].
71. Container,103 S. Ct. at 2956. See also 124 CONG. REc. 18400, 19076
(1978). See generally Human, The Tempest Over The Treaty: Implications
Of The United States-UnitedKingdom Tax Treaty For State And Local Taxation, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 509 (1979) (concluding that prohibition of worldwide unitary apportionment would be a backward step).
72. Container,103 S. Ct. at 2956. The first and only major congressional
act in the area of state taxation was the Act of September 14, 1959, Pub. L.
No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1982)). This legislation
was a direct response to the Supreme Court decision in Northwestern
States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959), permitting a
state to tax the interstate activity of a nonresident corporation which fairly
apportioned the corporation's activity to the taxing state. Pub. L. No. 86-272
limits the state taxing power because
(tjhe legislation denies to the States the power to impose taxes on or
measured by net income derived within the State from interstate commerce if the 'only business activities within such State. . .' are the solicitation of orders for sales... where the orders are sent outside the
State for approval or rejection and are filled... outside the State.

J.

HELLERSTEIN,

STATE TAXATION

I CORPORATE INCOME AND FRANCHISE

TAXES § 6.10 (1983).
Since 1959 there have been several attempts by Congress to bring state
taxation into conformity with federal and international standards. See
Note, Proposed CongressionalLimitations On State Taxation Of Multinational Corporations,11 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 343, 345 n.14 (1981). The most
recently proposed federal legislation is H.R. 2918, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983) and S. 1225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). Both bills are similar-both
would prohibit states from using the worldwide combined reporting system
in taxing multinational corporations and would require that state rules for
taxing dividends received by domestic corporations from their overseas
subsidiaries conform to the rules of the federal government. See Daily Tax

Rep. Pub. No. 89, State Limits Re-ProposedFor Taxing Multinationals G-1
(May 6, 1983).
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can resolve inequities that may arise in international taxation.
Furthermore, the presence of the mere threat of retaliation
against the United States by foreign trading partners indicated
that California's tax impaired federal uniformity. Finally, the
Solicitor General's opinion that California's tax impaired federal
uniformity was not properly considered by the Court.
When the Container Court implied that more than mere
double taxation had been relied on when the Japan Line tax
had been struck down, it failed to specify on what it did rely. 73 A
careful analysis of Japan Line indicates it relied on only two
tests: whether there was double taxation and whether the tax in
that case prevented the federal government from "speaking with
one voice. ' 74 The Japan Line Court had concluded that: "If a
state tax contravenes either of these precepts, it is unconstitutional under the commerce clause. '75 In Container, double taxation did in fact occur; 76 if Japan Line had been followed, that
fact alone would have been sufficient for the Court to hold California's tax unconstitutional.7 7 Nevertheless, California's uni73. Container, 103 S. Ct. at 2953.
74. Id. The writer has located eleven articles which comment on Japan
Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979). The authors of all
eleven articles concluded that, if a state taxes instrumentalities of foreign
commerce and the effect of the tax is to subject the taxpayer to double taxation, the state tax is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Note, A State Tax, Although
Consistent With The Commerce Clause Requirements for Interstate Commerce, May Not Be Applied Unilaterallyto Foreign Commerce, 45 J. Am L. &
COM. 559 (1980) (risk of multiple taxation is a burden which is clearly repugnant to the commerce clause); accord Note, Commerce Clause Limits on
Direct Taxation of Foreign Containers, 14 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 153 (1979);
Note, The Foreign Commerce Clause: An Economic Approach to the Negative Effects of State Taxation, 13 J. MAR. L. REV. 793 (1980); Note, The Negative Commerce Clause-A Strict Test For State Taxation Of Foreign
Commerce, 13 INT'L L. & POL. 135 (1980); Note, Limitations On State Taxation Of Foreign Commerce: The Contemporary Vitality Of The Home-Port
Doctrine, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 817 (1979); Note, Supreme Court Decisions In
Taxation, 33 TAx LAw. 506 (1980); Note, State Ad Valorem Taxes On Instrumentalities Of InternationalCommerce, 11 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1213 (1979);
Note, Taxation of Goods In InternationalCommerce, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 725
(1979); Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Commerce Clause-State Tax On Instrumentalities Of Foreign Commerce Invalid When Tax Results In Multiple
Taxation And Impairs Federal Uniformity In Regulation Of Foreign Trade,
12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 999 (1979); Note, ConstitutionalLaw--Commerce
Clause-State Taxation Of Foreign-Oumed Instrumentalities Used Exclusively In Foreign Commerce Is Forbidden By The Commerce Clause When
Multiple Taxation Or Impairment Of Uniform Federal Regulation Of Foreign Commerce Would Result, 19 VA. J. INT'L L. 915 (1979); Note, Constitutional Law--The Scope Of The Commerce Clause In International
Commerce, 55 WASH. L. REV. 885 (1980).
75. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 451 (emphasis added).
76. Container, 103 S. Ct. at 2951.
77. Japan Line 441 U.S. at 451, 453.
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78
tary tax was upheld by the Container Court.

The Container Court had attempted to distinguish Japan
Line by reasoning that multiple taxation was more easily
avoided in Japan Line because the Court was able to tell California simply not to impose a tax at all, whereas a similar
"bright-line" rule in Container would have been unfair because
a portion of Container Corporation's income was clearly domestic. 79 This reasoning is specious; the Court could have easily upheld California's method of combined unitary taxation and still
have prevented double taxation of foreign income by requiring
California to use the "water's-edge" approach to combined unitary taxation. The "water's-edge" approach is based on the
same method of taxation California employs. Under the
"water's-edge" approach, however, foreign income, and the apportionment factors associated with it, are not included in the
unitary group.80 Because California would have been free to ap78. The Container decision is an inconsistent application of the constitutional principles developed in Japan Line and the result is confusion
among both taxpayers and local taxing authorities. This confusion leads to
expensive litigation and wastes the Court's resources. For example, in 1945,
the Supreme Court held that Ohio's property tax assessment on imported
raw materials which were stored in their original containers for later use
violated the import-export clause. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S.
652 (1945). In 1976, however, the Court overruled a 105-year-old precedent
banning property taxation of imports when it upheld the constitutionality of
a state property tax levied, without regard to the point of origin, on imported tires which had been mixed with domestically manufactured tires
and stored for future use. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
The Michelin Court twice cited the Hooven & Allison case without expressly overruling or affirming that case. Id. at 281, 301 n.13. Today, Hooven
& Allison Company is again before the Supreme Court because Ohio now
believes it can assess the property tax in light of the Michelin case. At a
minimum, the Supreme Court should have made a clear statement regarding the precedential value of Hooven &Allison in order to prevent needless
litigation.
79. Container, 103 S.Ct. at 2953.
80. The "water's edge" approach to unitary taxation is based on the
same principle as worldwide combined reporting except that foreign source
income is excluded from apportionable income unless a dividend is actually
paid from subsidiaries. Thus, a "water's edge" approach to unitary taxation
would prevent double taxation of foreign income and would not impair the
federal uniformity or prevent the federal government from speaking with
one voice. See Brooks, Speaking With One Voice-A Uniform Glossaryfor
State Taxation of Interstate Business, 2 J. ST. TAx'N 5 at 15-16 (1983) (domestic combined reporting includes the "taxpayer-corporation and its U.S.

affiliates" (as opposed to foreign affiliates) and "[t]he distinction between

worldwide and domestic combination is that states employing domestic
combined reporting adopt a 'water's-edge' approach to determine what corporation will be included in the combined group...") (emphasis retained).
A clearer distinction between domestic combined reporting, worldwide
combined reporting, and the "water's-edge" approach can be made. Domestic combined reporting includes the taxpayer and only U.S. companies
owned or controlled by the taxpayer by more than 50%. Worldwide combined reporting includes all companies, foreign as well as domestic, owned
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portion Container Corporation's domestic income to its jurisdiction, a "bright-line" rule of banning double taxation of foreign
income could have been applied in Container.
The Container Court also stated that California's method of
taxation did not inevitably lead to double taxation, whereas in
Japan Line the Court held the converse. 8 ' Mathematically, it
can be shown that the worldwide combined method of unitary
taxation will always lead to double taxation of foreign income;
under the worldwide approach, foreign income will always be
included in the state's net taxable income apportionable to that
state. 82 Thus, Container and Japan Line cannot be distinguished on the issue of double taxation.
The Container Court stated furthermore that it would not
by the taxpayer by more than 50%. The "water's-edge" approach taxes only
U.S. source income; there is no taxation of foreign source income.
81. Container, 103 S. Ct., at 2952. The validity of the Court's conclusion
that double taxation under California's tax is not inevitable may be questioned. The Container Court reasoned that the double taxation in Japan
Line necessarily resulted from Japan's claiming the right to tax a given
value in full and California's claiming the right to tax the same entity in
part. Id. The Court then stated that, in Container, there were two distinct
methods of allocating the income of a multinational corporation to California, either the arm's-length approach or the formulary apportionment. The
Court finally concluded: "Whether the combination of the two methods results in the same income being taxed twice or in some portion of income not
being taxed at all is dependent sqlely on the facts of the individual case."
Id. The Court footnoted this statement and referred to Chicago Bridge &
Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 103 S. Ct. 3562 (1983) (case dismissed) in
which the taxpayer paid less Illinois tax under the worldwide combined reporting method than it did using the separate company approach. The
Court inferred that, because lower taxes were paid, no double taxation necessarily resulted in Chicago Bridge & Iron.
The Court's reasoning is confusing and illusory. First, the Japan Line
facts are anlogous to the Container facts. In Container, a foreign jurisdiction claimed the right to tax the foreign income in full (evidenced by foreign
tax credits) and California claimed the right to tax the same value in part.
Additionally, the Court was not faced with deciding between two distinct
methods of allocating the income of Container Corporation to California.
The Court could have allowed California to employ the water's-edge combined approach, but did not even consider this alternative. See supra note
80 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, the worldwide combined unitary method of apportionment will always lead mathematically to double taxation of foreign income.
See infra note 82.
82. The appellant, Container Corporation, argued the following:
(1)

United Nations statistics for the years 1974-1980, .

.

. show that

while wages throughout the world are increasing, the same disparity
between wages paid United States workers and those in less industrialized countries continues to exist. Furthermore, as the United States
Tariff Commission has demonstrated, these differences in wage rates
are not offset by lower productivity for workers in various economic settings. These studies are corroborated by other resources.
Appellant's Brief on the Merits at 12-13, Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise
Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983).
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(2) As stated in Peterson, CaliforniaFranchiseTax: Combined Income Reports Affects Foreign Companies, 44 J. TAX 184, 187 (1976):
.... wage levels are considerably lower in Japan, Italy or almost
any other country than in the United States....
The same type of disparity exists as to the cost of plant or property....

An apportionment of worldwide income based on property and payroll could never, under these circumstances, properly apportion the income to the local activities that produced it.
Appellant's Brief on the Merits at 13 n.3, Container Corp. of Am. v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983).
In addition to the above, however, double taxation of foreign income
can be demonstrated mathematically to be inevitable. The following example shows this:
Incorporated

PARENT

SUBSIDIARY

United States

England

10MM
4.6MM

1MM

Taxable Income
Federal Taxes

COMBINED
11MM

.5MM

Foreign Taxes
Net Income
Sales In State
Property In State

:

5.9MM
50MM

.5MM

5.4MM
50MM
20MM

20MM
5MM

5MM

Payroll In State
Sales Everywhere
Property Everywhere:
Payroll Everywhere

1,000MM
40MM

100MM
8MM

1,100MM
48MM

7MM

.IMM

8.1MM

COMPUTATION OF STATE TAX LIABILITY
Worldwide Combined Return

Separate Company Return

apportionment factor.

apportionment factor:
50MM

+

1,000MM

20MM
-

+

40MM

5MM

50MM

7MM

1,100MM

+

-

FEDERAL NET INCOME
ADD:

FEDERAL TAXES

FEDERAL PRE-TAX INCOME
APPORTIONMENT FACTOR
APPORTIONED INCOME
STATE TAX RATE
STATE TAX LIABILITY

+

5MM
8.1MM

48MM
3

3
apportionment factor

20MM

.4214286

apportionment factor

5.4MM

FEDERAL NET INCOME

4.6MM

ADD:

10MM
.4214286
$4,214,286
10%
$421,419

-

FED/FOREIGN TAXES

FEDERAL PRE-TAX INCOME
APPORTIONMENT FACTOR
APPORTIONED INCOME
STATE TAX RATE
STATE TAX LIABILITY

.3598017
5.9MM
5.1MM
11MM
.3598017
$3,957,819
10%
$395,782

Based on the above hypothetical, the worldwide combined return results in a $25,647 lower state income tax liability than that computed on the
separate return basis ($421,429-$395,782). However, of the $1MM of foreign
income, $359,802 (.359802 x $1MM) is apportioned to the state. Since the
state income tax rate is 10%, $35,980 of the taxpayer's state income tax liability is due to the inclusion of foreign income. Thus, even though the taxpayer in the above hypothetical would pay less tax under the worldwide
combined method as compared to the separate return method in which no
foreign income is subject to tax, one cannot automatically conclude that foreign income will not be subject to the taxation by both the foreign jurisdiction and the state. On the contrary, mathematically, foreign income is
necessarily subject to double taxation using the worldwide combined
method of apportionment.

19841

Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd.

require California to follow the federal arm's-length approach. 83
Container stated that the federal approach does not guarantee
an elimination of double taxation. 84 The Court decided that, in
the absence of a central authority which would coordinate the
state approaches to taxing foreign income with the federal approach, absolute consistency would be too much to ask of state
taxing authorities. 85 The Court's rejection of the federal approach on the grounds that it fails to guarantee an elimination of
double taxation is inappropriate. Realistic guidelines for determining the constitutional limits of a state taxing scheme would
not require an absolute guarantee against double taxation, or
even absolute consistency. Accounting is an art form, not an exact science. 86 The federal arm's-length approach 87 to taxation of
multinational companies is more consistent with the international custom of taxation than the worldwide combined approach and, at a minimum, would provide a better guarantee of
88
eliminating double taxation of foreign income.
The federal approach is also preferable because it provides
for the resolution of inequities which may arise in international
83. Container, 103 S. Ct. at 2954-2955.
84. Id. at 2953.
85. Id. at 2954.
86. In a college textbook on managerial cost accounting, the authors
point out the difficulty of measuring and determining a firm's results of operations. "The determination of income and financial position is important,
but any determination is going to be inexact and subject to numerous assumptions. It is interesting to note that no matter how elaborate the costaccounting system, there would still exist problems of income and financial
position determination." H. BIERMAN &T. DYCKMAN, MANAGERIAL COST AcCOUNTING 4 (2d ed. 1976).
In addition, the Court has recognized that any apportionment method
will result in some inconsistency. In Container Corp. of America v.
Franchise Tax Bd., the Court said:
Both geographical accounting and formula apportionment are imperfect proxies for an ideal which is not only difficult to achieve in practice, but also difficult to describe in theory. Some methods of formula
apportionment are particularly problematic because they focus on only
a small part of the spectrum of activities by which value is generated.
Although we have generally upheld the use of such formulas, see, e.g.,
Moorman Mfg. Co., supra; Underwood Typewriter Co., supra, we have
on occasion found the distortive effect of focusing on only one factor so
outrageous in a particular case so as to require reversal.
Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2949 (1983).
87. See Appellant's Brief On The Merits at 30-31, Container Corp. of Am.
v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933 (1983) (arm's-length standard is internationally accepted norm for income allocation of related taxpayers).
88. One of the principal reasons for concluding a treaty with other trading nations is to remedy the problem of double taxation. See Model Treaty
Art. 23 (relief from double taxation). See also P. POSTLEWA1TE, INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE TAXATION § 4.01 (1980) (many nations enter into bilateral agreements or conventions with other trading nations to limit double
taxation effects).
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taxation, for example, the elimination of double taxation
through the use of "competent authority." 89 States imposing a
tax on foreign income do not have the power to deal with foreign
nations and they have no mechanism such as the competent authority to resolve the problems of double taxation. 90 If the
states were required to follow the federal approach when taxing
foreign income, however, the necessary competent authority
would be automatically provided for them.
The Court's argument that foreign nations will not retaliate
if states tax the foreign income of a unitary business lacks an
adequate foundation. Automatic asymmetry is not required
before a foreign nation will retaliate.9 1 The key factor in determining whether a foreign nation will retaliate is that nation's
subjective observation whether it needs to react to a worldwide
92
combined state tax.

Container also reasoned that, because the tax is on a domestic corporation, there should be no reason for foreign nations to retaliate.9 3 The Court's reasoning is unsatisfactory for a
89. See Model Treaty Art. 26 (extension of information obtained from
administrative measures which are used in investigating jurisdiction's own
collection of tax). See also P. POSTLEWAmTE, INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE
TAXATON § 4.01 (1980) ("Treaties constitute a workable method of insuring
that the foreign jurisdiction makes a correlative reduction in taxes previously assessed, if competent authorities of both jurisdictions agree that income has in fact been misstated.").
90. 103 S.Ct. at 2954 n.31.
91. See Memorandum For The United States As Amicus Curiae at 3,
Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 103 S.Ct. 3562 (1983)
(case dismissed). In Chicago Bridge & Iron, Illinois imposed a worldwide
unitary tax which resulted in a refund to the taxpayer and which did not
result in an automatic asymmetry. Yet, reaction by foreign governments to
this tax was clear as the Solicitor General stated in the memorandum:
We are accordingly advised by the Departments of State and Treasury,
the Department of Commerce, acting at the request of the Delegation of
the Commission of the European Communities, and the United States
Trade Representative, that a number of foreign governments have complained-both officially and unofficially-that the apportioned combined method employed by Illinois and other states creates an irritant
in their commercial relations with the United States. Retaliatory taxation may ensue, with consequent damage to international trade.
Memorandum For The United States As Amicus Curiae, Chicago Bridge &
Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 103 S.Ct. 3562 (1983) (case dismissed).
92. "Already, several investment projects planned within the United
States have been cancelled as a result of state use of worldwide unitary
taxation. In addition, several trading partners-notably Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom-have sent strong letters of protest to the
Reagan Administration warning of serious repercussions unless this form
of taxation is curbed." Daily Tax Rep. Pub. No. 186, Tax Policy G-3 (Sept. 23,
1983).
93. 103 S.Ct. at 2955-56.
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number of reasons. 94 For example, foreign nations may be legitimately concerned that states may extend the worldwide combined unitary principle to foreign parent corporations which
have subsidiaries in the United States. 95 In addition, foreign nations may have a legitimate concern in trying to prevent the
spread of the worldwide unitary principle to third world coun96
tries where foreign corporations have many operations.
Containertheorized that California's tax did not prevent the
federal government from "speaking with one voice" because the
federal government had not expressed any concern in the
Container97 case and because there was no congressional legislation in the area. 98 The Court's equating the absence of the Solicitor General's amicus curiae brief, with a lack of concern by
the executive branch on the subject, was not well founded. The
Solicitor General had filed a brief in the case of Chicago Bridge
& Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Co.,99 which was already before the
Court and which dealt with the same issues presented in
Container.0 0 Justice Powell stated in his dissent: "I see no reason to ignore the Solicitor General's view in one case currently
pending before the Court when considering another case that
raises exactly the same issue. The Solicitor General has not
withdrawn his previous memorandum .... 101
The Court correctly observed that there was no federal di94. For example, the following excerpt is from an article which appeared in a British newspaper fourteen days after the Supreme Court
handed down the Container decision.
A new campaign against the recently upheld right of American
states to levy unitary taxes will be launched this week. A retaliatory
amendment to the Finance Bill could result in American companies losing their British Advance Corporation Tax (ACT) rebate and a stiff note

is on its way from Mr. Nigel Lawson, the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
to Washington.

Retaliatory Amendment Spearheads Campaign Against Unitary Tax, THE
TIMES (London), July 11, 1983, at 15, col. 2.
95. See Daily Tax Rep. Pub. No. 187, Unitary Tax G-5 (Sept. 26, 1983).
96. Id.
97. 103 S.Ct. at 2955-56.
98. Id. at 2956.
99. See Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 103 S.Ct.
3562 (1983) (case dismissed) (lack of substantial federal question).
100. See infra note 101.
101. 103 S.Ct. at 2960 (Powell, J., dissenting). The Solicitor General filed
a Memorandum For The United States as Amicus Curiae, Chicago Bridge &
Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 103 S.Ct. 3562 (1983) (case dismissed).
At issue in Chicago Bridge & Iron was the Illinois worldwide combined unitary method of taxation. The Solicitor General filed an amicus curiae brief
on behalf of the federal government in opposition to Illinois' method of taxation. The Solicitor General urged the Court to find the Illinois tax unconstitutional because it presented a risk of double taxation and it prevented
the federal government from "speaking with one voice" in its dealings with
foreign nations. See Memorandum For The United States As Amicus Cu-
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rective prohibiting California from imposing its tax;10 2 it does
not automatically follow from this, however, that the tax would
be consonant with the federal government's ability to "speak
with one voice."' 0 3 There was, in fact, considerable evidence
before the court to the contrary. For example, numerous letters
from foreign heads of state were sent to the federal government;
the letters expressed the concern of those leaders and the possibility that they would be forced to take retaliatory action if the
states' taxing power were not curbed. 10 4 In ignoring evidence of
10 5
the concern of foreign trading partners of the United States,
the Court did not properly consider the international implications of California's tax.
The decision in Container has allowed various states employing the worldwide combined method of formula apportionriae, Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 103 S. Ct. 3562
(1983) (case dismissed).
In Chicago Bridge & Iron, the taxpayer was entitled to a refund using
the worldwide combined method and the Solicitor General admitted that
the tax did not "create multiple taxation in fact." Id. at 13-14. The Solicitor
General recommended: "Accordingly, if the Court wishes to consider the
question in this case in the context of a case involving multiple taxation in
fact, it may wish to defer decision in this case and note probable jurisdiction
in Container Corporationof America v. Franchise Tax Board No. 81-523."

Memorandum For The United States As Amicus Curiae at 14, Chicago
Bridge &Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 103 S.Ct. 3562 (1983) (case dismissed).
After urging for a declaration that the Illinois tax was unconstitutional,
the Solicitor General reiterated his recommendation. "If the Court concludes, however, that the record in this case is inadequate to support such a
disposition, we urge it to defer resolution of the issue to another case which
has a more fully developed record." Id. at 16.
102. 103 S.Ct. at 2956.
103. Congress has not acted in this area because of political pressures
from lobbying efforts by the states and by the Multistate Tax Commission.
See Note, Proposed CongressionalLimitations On State Taxation of Multinational Corporations, 11 GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 343 (1981).
104. First, the Court had before it the Solicitor General's amicus curiae
brief in the Chicago Bridge & Iron case which represented the govern-

ment's views on the problems created by unitary taxation and its effects on
the government's ability to deal with foreign nations. See supra note 101.
Second, Container Corporation had attached the Solicitor General's brief to
its own brief and included letters from the United Kingdom and Canada
expressing concern over the states' use of the worldwide apportionment
method.
105. See Appellant's Brief On The Merits at A-6 - A-23, Container Corp. of
Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S.Ct. 2933 (1983) (letter from Canadian Embassy, letter from Embassy of Belgium on behalf of the Ten E. E. C. Governments as President, and appellant attached a copy of the Memorandum For
The United States As Amicus Curiae to the Chicago Bridge & Iron case).
See also Memorandum For The United States As Amicus Curiae ified by

the Solicitor General in Chicago Bridge &Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
103 S.Ct. 3562 (1983) (case dismissed) (attached letter from British Embassy on behalf of the Ten E. E. C. Governments as President, letter from
Canadian Embassy).
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ment to collect $600 million to $900 million of tax revenuerevenue that they would have been forced to forego if California's tax had been declared unconstitutional. 0 6 The Container
decision, however, conflicts with a national interest in keeping
United States multinational companies economically competitive in international trade and in attracting foreign investment
into the United States. The Container decision was further tarnished because it did not establish any constitutional limitation
on a state's power to tax the foreign income of a unitary business; 10 7 by leaving this question unanswered, the Court will
cause taxpayers to engage in even more litigation in the
future. 08
The Container decision is wholly unsatisfactory. The evidence of dismay and concern among leaders of the United
States' foreign trading partners, that the tax may lead to retaliation against the United States, 0 9 should not have been ignored.
If the states are prohibited from applying the worldwide combined method of taxation to domestic corporations with foreign
parents, significant due process complications arise. 110
106. See Daily Tax Rep. Pub. No. 186 Tax Policy G-3 (Sept. 23, 1983) (estimates made by various state officials interviewed).
107. 103 S. Ct. at 2956 n.32. (Court not deciding issue of whether worldwide combined unitary tax was constitutional where tax falls upon domestic corporation owned by foreign interests). See also dissenting opinion in
which Justice Powell discussed the dilemma the Court will face when confronted by the issue. He wrote:
There can be little doubt that the parent's government would be offended by the State's action and that international disputes, or even
retaliation against American corporations, might be expected. It thus
seems inevitable that the tax would have to be found unconstitutional-at least to the extent it is applied to the foreign companies. But
in my view, invalidating the tax only to this limited extent also would
be unacceptable. It would leave California free to discriminate against
a Delaware corporation in favor of an overseas corporation. I would not
permit such discrimination without explicit congressional authorization (footnotes omitted).
Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2933, 2960 (1983).
108. Litigation on this issue has already begun in California. See Shell
Petroleum N.V. v. Graves, No. c-81-4302. Shell asked for a preliminary injunction to prevent the California Franchise Tax Board from collecting information from Shell Petroleum, a Netherlands corporation, and assessing
the tax on its domestic subsidiary, Scallup Nuclear, which includes Shell's
foreign income. On August 4, 1982, the U.S. District Court, Northern District
of California, held that Shell lacked standing to raise its claims and the controversy was not ripe for a decision because Shell had only received a proposed assessment and had not yet undergone the statutory hearing and
appeal process. If the California Franchise Tax Board issues Shell Petroleum an additional assessment based on the inclusion of its foreign source
income, Shell will certainly protest the assessment in the courts.
109. See supra note 104.
110. The potential due process issue is generally recognized. But, the
significance of the issue is discounted by some observers. See, e.g., XX TAX
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Container left these problems unresolved.
There appears to be only one rational explanation for the
Container Court's strained attempt to distinguish Japan Line:
the Court is seeking to force Congress to take legislative action
to regulate state taxation of foreign income."' In the past, legislative action by Congress could not realistically be expected in
light of domestic political pressures. 112 Legislation designed to
regulate state taxation of foreign income of corporations is again
pending before both the House and the Senate. 113 The unique
combination of political pressure from foreign nations and multinational companies, and the increase in the number of states
employing the worldwide combined method of unitary taxation,
may, this time, require the executive branch and Congress to
4
take measures to regulate state taxation of foreign income."
Although the decision in Container was not as well-reasoned as
No. 10, The PotentialTax Break For ForeignMultinationals771,
779-80 (Sept. 5, 1983).
111. The Court has expressed, as early as 1959, its view that it is the job
of Congress to regulate the state's taxing power. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 476 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The problem calls for solution by devising a congressional
policy.").
112. The following statement helps to explain why Congress has refused,
or at least has been unable, to legislate in this area. The author is commenting on the United States-United Kingdom tax treaty.
The states, backed by the prestigious Multistate Tax Commission,
stoutly defended the worldwide application of their method of tax determination as the only feasible and fair means for the division of the
income of multinational businesses for tax purposes. The states feared
large revenue losses, and they objected to the loopholes the treaty approach was said to create for multinational corporations. The states
also decried the invasion state tax perogatives. Treasury and taxpayer
representatives countered that the state technique is unfair when extended to international operations and was contrary to the best national economic interests. A resolution of this debate is especially
difficult to imagine since both camps had valid objections to the other
party's scheme for the division of international income.
Human, The Tempest Over The Treaty: Implications of the United StatesUnited Kingdom Tax Treaty for State and Local Taxation, 23 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 509, 511-12 (1979).
113. H.R. 2918, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) and S. 1225, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983). See also supra note 72.
114. President Reagan's support of federal legislation to limit the states'
ability to tax foreign source income from multinational corporations is
viewed as imperative for its success. It appears, however, that President
Reagan will take no stand on this issue until after the 1984 elections. A
chronological history concerning the Containercase illustrates why numerous bills proposing federal legislation of state taxation have failed and how
sensitive the issue is to the state government, the federal government, and
foreign nations.
(1) November 9, 1981. The Supreme Court notes probable jurisdiction to hear the Chicago Bridge & Iron case. 454 U.S. 1029 (1981).
(2) January 18, 1982. Solicitor General submits an amicus brief to
the Court urging the Court to find worldwide combined unitary
NOTES PUB.
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some opinions which have been handed down by the United
taxation unconstitutional in the Chicago Bridge & Iron case. 455
U.S. 917 (1982).
(3) January 21, 1982. Firestorm of protest from governors and local
tax officials over the Solicitor General's entering the Chicago
Bridge & Iron case. Washington Post, Jan. 21, 1982, § G at 1, col. 3.
(4) May 3, 1982. The Supreme Court notes probable jurisdiction to
hear ContainerCorp. of Am. v. FranchiseTax Bd. 102 S. Ct. 2034
(1982).
(5) June 27, 1983. Supreme Court hands down Container decision
upholding constitutionality of worldwide combined unitary taxation. 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983).
(6) June 27, 1983. Container Corporation decides to file a petition for
rehearing due to Court's assumption that federal government
had changed its position when it did not file an amicus brief in
the Container case. See Daily Tax Rep. Pub. No. 197, Supreme
Court Refuses to Rehear Unitary Tax Case, G-1 (Oct. 11, 1983)
(petition filed Sept. 3, 1983).
(7) July 12, 1983. Florida legislature passes legislation permitting
worldwide combined unitary taxation. Daily Tax Rep. Pub. No.
136, G-5 (July 14, 1983).
(8) July 12, 1983. United Kingdom's Chancellor of the Exchequer
writes President Reagan urging him to lead legislation limiting
the states' taxing power of foreign income. XX TAx NOTES PUB.

(9)

(10)

(11)
(12)

(13)

No.6, Chancellorof the Exchequer on the Unitary Tax Method 450
(August 8, 1983).
July 26, 1983. President Reagan requests a recommendation from
the Cabinet Council On Economic Affairs regarding the proper
position for the executive branch to take on the unitary tax issue.
XX TAX NOTES PUB. No. 9, Administration Formulating Opinion
On Unitary Tax 759 (Aug. 29, 1983).
August 29, 1983. Reagan Administration is faced with pressure
from the states on one side and from foreign governments and
multinationals on the other. California, North Dakota, Utah, Vermont, other state governors and tax officials, and congressional
delegations and representatives of state groups such as the National Governors Association and National Conference of State
Legislators have been lobbying. Some multinational corporations are lobbying through the National Association of Manufacturers, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and National Foreign Trade
Council. Coca-Cola, Colgate-Palmolive, Mobil, and CBI Industries are lobbying separately. Foreign governments are expressing their concerns. The Canadian Embassy, the Delegation of
Commission of European States, Italy, Greece, Japan, and the
Netherlands have written the Treasury. Britain is the most vocal
nation in expressing opposition to unitary taxation. XX TAX
NOTES PUB. No. 9, Administration Formulating Opinion On Unitary Tax 759 (Aug. 29, 1983).
September 2, 1983. Container Corporation files a petition for rehearing. Daily Tax Rep. Pub. No. 173, Cabinet Council Chooses
Approach To Unitary Tax G-6 (Sept. 6, 1983).
September 6,1983. Cabinet Council On Economic Affairs unanimously recommends that the executive branch support legislation permitting "water's-edge" approach to combined unitary
taxation. Id.
September 6, 1983. Prime Minister of England, Margaret Thatcher, writes letter to President Reagan expressing British concern
over the unitary tax issue and favoring "water's-edge" approach.
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States Supreme Court during its celebrated history, the Court
may have achieved its goal: because of the decision in
Container, Congress may now be forced to consider that
115
legislation.
Daniel Frommeyer

Daily Tax Rep. Pub. No. 178, Unitary Tax Decision Delayed*By
President G-3 (Sept. 13, 1983).
(14)
September 12, 1983. Governor Thompson of Illinois, as Chairman
of the National Governors Association, writes President Reagan
urging him not to file a brief supporting Container Corporation in
its petition for rehearing. XX TAX NOTES PUB. No. 13, The Unitary Method of Taxation: Two Views 1045 (Sept. 26, 1983).
(15)
September 12, 1983. Netherlands sends telegram urging abolishment of unitary tax system. Daily Tax Rep. Pub. No. 182, Unitary
Tax Seen Cutting U.S. Overseas Investments G-6 (Sept. 19, 1983).
(16)
September 13, 1983. President Reagan delays decision on unitary
tax dilemma. Daily Tax Rep. Pub. No. 178, Unitary Tax Decision
Delayed By President G-3 (Sept. 13, 1983).
(17)
September 14, 1983. Japan government calls on U.S. government
to take appropriate measures to abolish the unitary tax system.
Daily Tax Rep. Pub. No. 179, Unitary System Threatens Investment In U.S., Japanese Government Warns G-5 (Sept. 14, 1983).
(18)
September 22, 1983. President Reagan establishes a unitary tax
task force to study the issues and to recommend a solution to the
controversy. The government decides not to file an amicus brief
in the Container Corporation's petition for rehearing. Daily Tax
Rep. Pub. No. 185, Reagan To Establish Unitary Task Force G-4
(Sept. 22, 1983). It is estimated that any recommendation will not
be made until late 1984. Daily Tax Rep. Pub. No. 188, Rep. Conable Criticizes Reagan Unitary Task Force G-4 (Sept. 27, 1983).
(19) October 11, 1983. Supreme Court refuses to rehear the Container
decision. 104 S. Ct. 265 (1983).
115. The Unitary Task Force has announced, as its major goal, the "full
accountability" of corporations. XXI TAX NOTE PUB. No. 12, Unitary Task
Force Seeks 'Full Accountability,' 1132 (Dec. 19, 1983).

